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he President and the leadership of Congress agree that the federal
government should be diminished in size. Department after de-
partment, agency after agency, have been nominated for reduction
or elimination. Seldom mentioned in this connection are the federal in-
stitutions for the administration of criminal justice. This is an unfortunate
oversight. The size of the federal police,' prosecution,2 correction, 3 and
judicial institutions4 devoted to the administration of criminal justice can
be reduced without important effect on crime rates by using state institu-
tions more and federal institutions less. No reduction in the effectiveness
of law enforcement need result, while several benefits would be secured.
The growth of federal institutions for the administration of criminal
justice has been steady throughout this century, 5 but has been almost me-
teoric since 1980.6 No part of the federal government has grown more
rapidly in recent years.7 The cause of the growth is not hard to under-
stand. Voters want crime prevented. Hence, no candidate for federal of-
* Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. Traci Jones gathered the references
and provided editorial assistance.
1. In fiscal 1994, the total number of federal law enforcement employees in the De-
partment of Justice was over 96,000. 1994 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 1 [hereinafter AG AN-
NUAL REPORT]. Of this number, over 9000 are lawyers, including about 1400 in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
2. There are now almost 8000 attorneys in the Department of Justice, a little more
than half assigned to the offices of United States Attorneys. There is no official calculation
of the proportion of their efforts invested in criminal matters, but it is likely a major frac-
tion. Id. at 3.
3. The Bureau of Prisons now operates 72 facilities, housing in 1993 about 90,000
prisoners and employing in 1993 almost 25,000 employees. AG ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 1, at 3; see also 1993 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF THE BUREAU 1, 27, 29 [herein-
after STATE OF THE BUREAU].
4. In 1993, authorized federal district and circuit judges were 649 and 179, respec-
tively. 1993 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 35 tbl. 26 [hereinafter AO
ANNUAL REPORT]. The number of persons employed in the federal judiciary was about
24,000. COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FED-
ERAL COURTS 10 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN].
5. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 9-10.
6. Since 1980, the number of federal prosecutors has increased about 125%. Id. at 11.
Since 1988, the number of federal prisoners has doubled. STATE OF THE BUREAU, supra
note 3, at 5.
7. In the last decade, the budgets of the Department of Justice and of the federal
courts have increased 171% and 170%, respectively, four times the growth of total federal
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fice finds it in his or her interest to say, even though it is true, that the
federal government can play only a limited role in crime control and is
not very effective at preventing most criminal conduct that people most
wish to deter. In our time, almost every Congress enacts new criminal
laws and increases sanctions on old ones.
Little thought has been given within the government to the secondary
consequences of the resulting redefinition of the federal role in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. A few wise observers have pointed to the
futility of this course,8 but they are drowned out by a chorus of those who
want the federal government to stand against crime. It therefore seems
useless in these times to suggest that Congress enact fewer criminal laws,
or to ask that it repeal some of those that are ineffective or unjust. It is
politically impossible to de-federalize criminal law enforcement. This ar-
ticle makes no such proposal. It does propose, however, that federal ini-
tiatives in crime control employ the services of state and local institutions
and personnel.
Federal criminal law was for most of our history limited to a short list
of uniquely federal offenses such as treason, espionage, counterfeiting
and federal tax evasion. 9 There is still a small core of federal criminal law
of that type. But most federal criminal law is now redundant to state
systems of criminal justice. Most federal laws regarding the use or sale of
controlled substances,10 kidnapping," bank robbing,' 2 auto theft,13 mail
and wire fraud,' 4 prostitution,15 and violence against women 16 prohibit
conduct that also offends state law and is subject to investigation by state
officers, prosecution in state courts, and correction in state prisons. Be-
cause of this enormous overlap between state and federal governments in
this field, it is a relatively simple matter to transfer work from federal
offices to the state. This requires no diminution of federal control or fed-
eral accountability for the results.
There are at least four benefits to be secured by using state and local
offices in the administration of criminal justice in preference to redundant
federal offices. One is that law enforcement by state and local offices is
generally less expensive than federal law enforcement. This is so in part
government spending and double the rate of increase in the cost of medicare and medicaid.
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 10.
8. See, e.g., Sara S. Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 979, 984-91 (1995); Kath-
leen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1135, 1154-59 (1995); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime:
Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43
KAN. L. REV. 503 (1995).
9. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 776 (1983).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
12. Id. § 2113 (1994).
13. Id. § 2312 (1994); id. § 2313 (1994).
14. Id. § 1341 (1994) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (1994) (wire fraud).
15. Id. § 2421 (1994).
16. Id. § 2261 (1994).
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because compensation for state and local officers reflects local economic
conditions and is therefore often lower. Also, state and local institutions
operate on larger numbers of cases and function over smaller territories
and are hence more cost-effective.
A second consideration is that state and local offices are more account-
able to the people they serve. Criminal law enforcement at all levels is
messy work evoking resistance and resentment not only from those who
are punished, but also from their friends, families, and allies. The odium
may be less when enforcement is done locally by officers who are ac-
countable to those whose conduct they control. State officers are less
likely to be perceived to be arrogant and overbearing. Moreover, to the
extent that the state governments can absorb the odium, we all benefit-
that some of us are enraged at our state or local government is a misfor-
tune, but it does not endanger our social order in the way that alienation
and hostility toward the national government does.
A third consideration is that maintenance of a large criminal law en-
forcement arm of the federal government may increase the hazard of mis-
conduct or corruption. These evils are endemic in criminal law
enforcement. No reasonable person can suppose that encounters such as
those at Ruby Ridge, Idaho 17 can be wholly prevented. The larger the
federal criminal law enforcement establishment, the more frequent will
be such events. State officers are not less prone to misconduct than fed-
eral officers; perhaps the opposite is true. But when these evils appear in
the federal government, they evoke responses infecting the whole body
politic. Moreover, there is then no higher government to whom we can
go to seek redress.
A fourth consideration is constitutional. As the recent decision in Lo-
pez' 8 reminds us, not all criminal conduct is the rightful concern of Con-
gress. Lopez casts a substantial cloud, for example, on federal laws
punishing violence against women. The constitutional consideration re-
flects practical problems associated with the fact that most crime, espe-
cially violent crime, is very local, and momentary, and hence beyond the
reach of law enforcement of continental proportions. Even by sending in
the Marines, the federal government cannot materially reduce the
number of guns in our schools. Nor can it do much with its own resources
to prevent domestic brutalities. Without undergoing large and funda-
mental change, the FBI cannot create an "800" telephone number en-
abling it to respond to urgent calls for help without an exponential
increase in its size. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that an FBI
response would be more effective than that of the local police. If Con-
gress needs to make a federal response to guns in schools or wife-beating,
this proposal offers it a means of doing so that is clearly within the ambit
17. Hearing of the Terrorism, Technology and Government Information Subcomm. of
the Senate Judiciary Comm.: Federal Raid at Ruby Ridge, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(chaired by Senator Arlen Specter), available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 10888340.
18. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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of its constitutional powers by enabling federal influence and control of
state personnel and institutions.
Named above are four types of federal criminal law enforcers: police,
prosecutors, courts, and corrections officers. All four can be partially re-
placed by state officers working on federal budgets and under some form
of federal direction or control. The issues presented differ somewhat
amongst the four.
1. Substituting State for Federal Courts. Even among the categories of
criminal cases in which federal law is redundant to state law, there are
some cases in which justice is well served by conducting trials in federal
rather than state courts. But such cases are few. One example is the trial
of complex securities fraud cases threatening -the integrity of national and
international markets. Others are cases involving corruption of state offi-
cials or alleged violations of federal civil rights or civil liberties by state
officials. But in the mine run of contemporary federal criminal litigation,
there is no reason to believe that the federal judiciary has any special
qualifications to conduct criminal trials. Whatever the aims of the federal
law in such matters, the purposes could be as well or better achieved by
conducting trials in state courts. Kidnappers, bank robbers, drug
merchants, and most white-collar criminals would be just as likely to be
convicted and just as deterred or punished by their convictions if con-
victed in state rather than federal court. The Department of Justice
could, therefore, prosecute many of its cases in state courts. To the extent
that it does, a transfer payment should be made to the states to help bear
the cost of their judicial administrations; such payments could be funded
by savings of costs otherwise incurred in maintaining and enlarging ex-
pensive federal courts. Such transfer payments would be necessary to as-
sure that the federal prosecutors would be given the cooperation of state
courts in the conduct of trials.
Federal judges would readily support a movement of judicial business
to the state courts. The recent report of the Long Range Planning Com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States 19 is replete with
pleas for Congressional sensitivity to the many difficult problems raised
by the ever-increasing criminal caseload. I doubt whether there is a sin-
gle member of the federal judiciary who would dispute the Report's argu-
ment that the federal courts need relief from an excess of criminal
litigation. The judges' concern, put more bluntly than they have put it, is
that United States district courts are becoming police courts. There is no
dishonor meant to police courts by this remark; we require police courts
and some, perhaps most, of them do good work. But institutions that
excel at the work of a police court are seldom well suited to many of the
other tasks that must be performed by the federal courts, such as the
enforcement of national laws bearing on civil matters, and on the conduct
of the national government. And, to use a costly United States district
19. AO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18-20, 22; see also FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 4-8 (1990).
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court to perform such routine service is a waste of scarce public
resources.
The removal annually of tens of thousands of prosecutions from the
dockets of federal courts would bring benefits to all other users of the
federal courts. The federal court system would be restored to the func-
tions it has so long performed in civil matters and in matters involving the
administration of the government of the United States. Direct benefi-
ciaries include all who litigate in those courts. The primary litigant in
federal court, one who is involved in a major fraction of all the cases, is
the government of the United States, 20 generally represented by the same
Department of Justice. 21 And the United States also has an interest in
many cases in which it is not a party, and in which no government attor-
neys appear. Much federal law enacted by Congress, beginning with the
civil rights acts of the Reconstruction era22 and the Sherman Act,23 is
designed for private enforcement in civil cases brought by private law-
yers. Private civil claims enforcing federal laws are now often given less
attention than they merit because of the preoccupation of federal courts
with criminal cases. Resulting economies would benefit the public fisc.
For these reasons, there is cause to hope that the whole national legal
system would function more effectively if the federal courts were less be-
leaguered than they are by heavy criminal dockets.
There is almost no apparent down-side to the use of state courts. Be-
cause so small a percentage of our litigation, criminal or civil, is con-
ducted in federal courts, the transfer of 20,000 federal prosecutions a year
to state courts would have little effect on most state courts. Of the per-
sons prosecuted in 1993, ninety-five percent were prosecuted in state
courts.24 An increase to ninety-seven and a half percent would reduce
the federal criminal docket by one-half with little noticeable effect on
most state court dockets. If the criminal caseloads of state courts were
increased, and if the increase came with a federal subvention to cover the
cost of state court administration, it is likely that the additional work
would be welcome in state courts, which ought to accept the arrangement
as federal recognition of the professionalism and worth of the state
courts.
One problem for state courts lies in the federal sentencing laws.25 Fed-
eral judges do not like the guidelines because they confine judicial discre-
20. Of 229,850 civil cases filed in fiscal 1993, the United States was a party in 51,724.
AO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at AI-51 tbl. C-1. Of 32,374 civil appeals, the United
States was a party in 7858. Id. at AI-38 tbl. B-7.
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ACTwITIES 1993-1994 2 (1994).
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988) (elective franchise); id. § 1981 (1988) (equal
rights under law).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
24. H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize is a Road to Ruin, 8 CRIM. JusT. 8, 8
(1993). Ninety-five percent of criminal prosecutions in the United States are handled by
state prosecutors. OFF. OF THE Ar'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBATING Vio-
LENT CRIME 4 (1992).
25. UNITES STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2D1.1 (West Supp. 1995).
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tion and require the imposition of some sentences that sentencing judges
deem unjust;26 it is unlikely that state court judges would like the sentenc-
.ing laws, either. However, in the state courts, federal sentencing law
would be an episodic burden and not a daily affront, as they are presently
to the federal judges.
2. Substituting State for Federal Prosecutors. The Department of Jus-
tice could employ state prosecutors to conduct many of its prosecutions,
especially those conducted in state courts. Federal policy with respect to
most classes of federal prosecutions could be pursued as effectively with
the power of the purse as by the present hierarchical means. A relatively
small office in the Justice Department could audit the performance of
federal contracts with state prosecutorial offices and, by conditioning fu-
ture contracts on satisfactory performance, induce compliance with the
Department's notions regarding the allocation of prosecutorial resources.
The Department could keep a presence in particular prosecutions as do
the general counsels of major private corporations, who participate in liti-
gation handled by local counsel. Indeed, the auditing of performance
would not be fundamentally different from that presently employed to
evaluate the performance of United States Attorneys, over whom the
control of the Attorney General of the United States is, for political rea-
sons, presently far from complete.27 And the accountability of state of-
fices in federal cases would likely elevate the quality of their performance
in all their work.
Most state and local prosecutors would welcome the proposed increase
in their responsibilities. They would be handling some important matters
and would be less overshadowed by their more highly-paid federal coun-
terparts. Their professionalism and their worth would be given new rec-
ognition by the federal government. Many would respond to the
opportunity to serve the federal government with enthusiasm and profes-
sional zeal.
3. Substituting State for Federal Correction. The prospect of doing time
in a state prison must be at least as deterrent as the prospect of doing
time in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Most existing fed-
eral facilities could be transferred to the states without effect on crime
rates. Federal corrections officers would place federal convicts in suitable
state prisons, contracting to pay appropriate fees for the services pro-
vided. They could retain control over parole decisions, but day-to-day
prison discipline would be in the hands of state officers.
This kind of contractual arrangement is not unknown at the present
time. Indeed, some state and local corrections facilities are now being
operated in some places by private organizations. Without turning fed-
26. See BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS 21-22 (1994);
William Polk, Judges Join Outcry Over New Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 18,1990,
at Al; Joseph B. Treaster, 7Wo Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at 1.
27. See Beale, supra note 8, at 1001, 1015-1017.
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eral corrections into a profit center for such enterprises, competition
could be established among state correction programs to win federal con-
tracts. This would induce efficiency and provide an occasion for federal
oversight of prisons aimed at assuring appropriate regard for the human
rights of prisoners in a role possibly more constructive than prison litiga-
tion in federal courts. This oversight might take the form of an adminis-
trative agency, perhaps established within the Judicial Conference of the
United States,28 to serve as a forum of first instance to hear claims of
prisoners regarding the circumstances of their imprisonment.
Possibly there are some federal convicts who need to be kept in federal
custody, but their number must be very small. As recently as 1980, there
were less than 30,000 convicts in federal custody; the number has now
tripled.29 The Crime Bill of 199330 will shortly double, triple, or quadru-
ple that number.31 The federal government might have superior ability to
fashion high-security or other special kinds of prisons; if so, perhaps it
should accept custody of some state prisoners on contract. Imaginably,
the federal government could devise a punishment serving as a suitable
alternative to costly capital punishment, such as permanent banishment
or exile to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. But absent some special con-
sideration of that type, the management of prisons should be an activity
of state governments, regardless of whether prisoners are convicted in
state or federal court or convicted of state or federal crimes.
4. Substituting State Police for Federal Police. Federal investigation is
likely essential with respect not only to uniquely federal crimes, but also
to high-tech crimes that state offices cannot be equipped to detect, and
also with respect to crimes involving activities in more than one state, or
having international involvements. It is at least possible, however, that
some investigatory work now done by federal officers could be done by
state officers temporarily assigned to federal cases and temporarily bear-
ing the badge of the United States.
There is good reason to prefer that violent police work be done at the
state or local level. If it is indeed necessary to break and enter a home to
secure evidence of crime or capture a criminal, it is far better that this
work be done by officers of some government other than the federal gov-
ernment. For example, if, as I believe, it was necessary to enter the com-
pound at Waco to arrest the Branch Davidians,32 it would have been far
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. See STATE OF THE BUREAU, supra note 3, at 29.
30. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701).
31. Senate Crime Bill Will More Than Double American Prison Population by Year
2005, CORRECTIONS DIG., Mar. 1994, at 1, 1-4; Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three
Strikes and You're Out!: The Political Sentencing Game, 59 FED. PROBATION 3, 16-17
(1995). In California, similar provisions quadrupled the state prison population between
1980 and 1992. Id.
32. See "Operation Trojan Horse;" Raid of the Branch Davidian Compound, Waco,
Texas: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Treasury, US. Postal Service, and General Gov-
ernment Appropriations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1995).
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better for the health of the nation if the command had been given, not by
the Attorney General of the United States, but by the Attorney General
of Texas. That officer had, and would have been seen to have had, a
much closer relation to, and responsibility for, the people in the com-
pound than could any federal officer. It may even be more likely that the
Branch Davidians would have surrendered to the Texas Rangers.
Not only is state law enforcement less likely to be odious to most citi-
zens, but divesting federal law enforcement officers of responsibility for
the messiest police work would free them to perform an indispensable
federal function-law enforcement to deter occasional misconduct of
state and local police. It is an unfortunate consequence of human frailty
and the temptations or provocations placed before police officers that
corruption and brutality occur in every police department.33 A special
problem with using federal officers to break-and-enter homes and arrest
those who resist is that there is lessened capacity to investigate and cor-
rect overzealous police work. If state officers are accused of needless
gunslinging resulting in the death of an alleged offender, that is an appro-
priate matter for federal concern.3 4 But when it is federal officers who
are accused of the gunslinging, it is less clear who can be trusted to make
an impartial investigation of the allegations. 35 There is today quite a lot
of police activity deemed necessary to secure us from the hazards of
crime that also jeopardizes our civil liberties. Police break-ins are much
more common than they were a few decades ago. On that account, the
recent enlargement of federal police departments is especially untimely.
Despite recent controversies, few would disagree with former President
Bush that federal police are generally professional in their work and not a
threat to the civil liberties of citizens. 36 But one reason that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has achieved an admirable level of professional-
ism has been its relatively modest size and the strict definition of its mis-
sion. Much of the growth of the federal police has come, and will
continue to come, in the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. One need not question the profession-
alism of those groups to be alarmed at the prospect that they are each
growing into small armies. If we must have such armies, it would be bet-
ter to have them acting on the command of state governments, but ac-
countable to the Department of Justice for their professionalism as well
as their effectiveness.
5. Achieving Substitutions One Step at a Time. To achieve the program
envisioned here, it would not be necessary to repeal any criminal laws
33. For a recent study of the frequency of use of excessive force, see CHARLES J.
OGLETREE, JR. ET AL., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE
CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES 29-36 (1994).
34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
35. See Stephen Labaton, Separatist Family Given $3.1 Million from Government, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1995, at Al.




enacted by Congress; all would continue to be enforced as now. Nor
would it be necessary to constrain Congress; doubtless, Congress would
continue to enact newer and ever more severe criminal laws, as de-
manded by the public. Nor would it be necessary to perform radical sur-
gery on any institution, state or federal. We need not lay off federal
judges, prosecutors, corrections officers, or police; the desired result
could be fully achieved over a decade with little dislocation to careers
now invested in federal administration of criminal justice through non-
replacement of retiring or departing personnel. Much of this program
could imaginably be achieved by the Department of Justice without en-
abling legislation, but so important an initiative should not be undertaken
without Congressional participation. The program entails three steps that
might be taken separately to diminish the risk of adverse unseen
consequences.
First, the Department of Justice could gradually commence bringing
prosecutions in state rather than federal courts. Funds saved as a result
of the diminishing federal court caseload could be used to provide grants
to the state court systems in which the prosecutions were brought. A
similar arrangement would be made with respect to some corrections
facilities.
Second, the number of federal prosecutors and defenders would be
gradually reduced, again using most of the funds saved to purchase
needed services from state law offices to bring and defend federal prose-
cutions in state courts. These contracts would empower the Department
of Justice to audit the performance of state officers entrusted with mat-
ters of importance to the federal government. The Department could re-
tain, in all cases or in individual cases, the power to approve plea
bargains. It would also retain the option and the resources to step in and
take over when circumstances seem to require that recourse.
Third, positions in federal police forces would be gradually replaced
with new federally-funded positions in the state police forces. The con-
tracts with state police departments would again confer substantial au-
thority in the United States Department of Justice to see that the
necessary police services were performed professionally and in a manner
responsive to federal political concerns. Remaining would be a number
of federal officers amply sufficient to investigate criminal activity
uniquely federal or crossing state or national boundaries, or requiring the
use of high-tech equipment or such exceptional resources as investigators
trained in accounting, and to investigate allegations of serious misconduct
by state or local officers not adequately managed at the state or local
level.
The Justice Department would, of course, remain a formidable organi-
zation. Much of its staff reduction would likely come gradually and in the
local offices of United States Attorneys. It would continue to prosecute
in federal court those few cases that are uniquely federal, or that a federal
court is especially suited to try, such as those intended to protect national
1996]
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or international investment markets. There would, on the other hand, be
few drug cases prosecuted in federal court because that is something state
offices now do on a large scale and with roughly equivalent effectiveness.
In such areas, the Department would purchase available prosecution and
defense services from the states.
This proposal is to be distinguished from the Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Act of the balmy days when federal funds were abundant and were
generously shared with state law enforcement institutions.3 7 This propo-
sal envisions federal use of federal money, using the personnel and insti-
tutions of the states to pursue federal objectives. Gradual reduction of
the size of the federal criminal justice establishment would improve gov-
ernment at all levels. It would save public money, greatly enhance the
efficacy of the federal courts, reduce the mistrust of government associ-
ated with criminal law enforcement at the national level, facilitate the
protection of civil liberties, and elevate the morale of officers serving in
state governments. Problems arising in use of state personnel and institu-
tions for federal purposes could be readily circumnavigated because the
resources would always remain available to revert to direct federal ad-
ministration whenever and wherever that proved to be genuinely benefi-
cial to the public served.
37. For accounts of the experience with LEAA, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN
D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 34-61 (1980); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE FED-
ERAL ROLE (1976); Howard E. Peskoe, The 1968 Safe Streets Act: Congressional Response
to the Growing Crime Problem, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 69 (1973).
[Vol. 49
